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TIME LIMITATIONS ON THE FILING OF TITLE VII
SUITS BY THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
In recognition of the seriousness of the employment discrimination
problem, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964' and
subsequently expanded the Act in 1972.2 The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC) is the agency vested with enforcement powers
under Title VII.
3
The EEOC originally was empowered to investigate employment dis-
crimination and attempt to eliminate it only by voluntary means of per-
suasion and conciliation.' By 1972, however, Congress realized that persua-
sion and conciliation alone were ineffective means to combat discrimina-
tory employment practices.5 In an effort to compel cooperation with EEOC
investigations and increase the Commission's leverage in negotiating ends
to discriminatory practices, Congress supplemented the EEOC's investiga-
tory and conciliatory power by conferring authority to institute civil ac-
tions in federal court.' Informal negotiation remains, however, the pre-
ferred method of dealing with a Title VII charge.' An unsuccessful attempt
I Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 701-716, 78 Stat. 253-266 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
88 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
2 Pub. L. No. 92-261, §§ 701-718, 86 Stat. 103-113 (1972) (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§8 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (Supp. V 1975).
See I.B.E.W., Local Union No. 5 v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1021 (1969).
5 H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2144 (emphasis on voluntariness has proven detrimental to enforcement
of Title VII).
The EEOC's need for greater enforcement powers had been recognized several years
earlier, but attempts to enact legislation conferring such increased powers upon the EEOC
had failed. For a discussion of earlier attempts to grant greater enforcement powers to the
EEOC see Hill, The Equal Employment Acts of 1964 and 1972: A Critical Analysis of the
Legislative History and Administration of the Law, 2 INDUS. REL. L.J., 1, 32-51 (Spring 1977)
[hereinafter cited as Hill]. For a history of Congressional debate over the optimal extent of
EEOC power, see, Sape & Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportun-
ity Act of 1972, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 824, 824-45 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Sape & Hart].
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 3, 9, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2139, 2145 (power to
bring suit will make EEOC enforcement procedures effective).
I The power to bring suit was intended to supplement, rather than supersede, the
EEOC's original functions. The informal means of conciliation and persuasion still are pre-
ferred over court actions. See, e.g., EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); see Sape & Hart, supra note 5, at 839; Note,
Procedural Developments Under Title VII. Protection for Both Parties?, 27 CASE W.L. REV.
371, 406 (Fall 1976) [hereinafter cited as Protection for Both Parties?]. Contra, Peck, The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission: Developments in the Administrative Process
1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REv. 831, 863 (1976) (Congressional awareness of general failure of
conciliation prior to 1972 amendments indicates conciliation no longer preferred) [hereinafter
cited as Peck].
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by the EEOC to reach a solution by means of conciliation is a condition
precedent to the institution of a suit by the Commission.'
The requirement that the EEOC attempt conciliation of a claim before
filing suit often results in the passage of considerable time between the
filing of the complaint with the Commission and the EEOC's institution
of a suit.' Consequently, employer-defendants often are faced with suits
EEOC procedure is currently initiated by the filing of a charge with the Commission by
an aggrieved person, by an individual on behalf of an aggrieved person, or by a member of
the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975). If the state in which the alleged violation
occurs has an agency authorized to deal with discrimination problems, the aggrieved individ-
ual may not file a complaint with the EEOC until he has first filed a complaint with the state
agency and either 60 days have elapsed, or the state proceedings have terminated. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(c) (Supp. V 1975).
An individual's charge must be filed with the Commission within 180 days of the alleged
discriminatory act. .42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (Supp. V 1975). The Commission must notify the
respondent of the charge within 10 days of the filing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), (e) (Supp. V
1975). The EEOC investigates and determines whether reasonable cause exists to believe that
the charge is true. "So far as practicable," the determination of whether there is reasonable
cause is made within 120 days of the filing. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
If the Commission finds no reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the EEOC
dismisses the charge and notifies the charging party of the dismissal. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)
(Supp. V 1975). The charging party may choose to file a private civil action upon receipt of
the dismissal notice, but must do so within 90 days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (1) (Supp. V 1975).
The individual may bring such an action despite a Commission finding of no reasonable cause
because final responsibility for the enforcement of Title VII lies with the courts. Alexander
v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
If reasonable cause is found, however, the EEOC attempts to resolve the problem by
means of informal "conference, conciliation or persuasion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp.
V 1975). If reasonable cause is found and no solution has been reached within 30 days of the
filing of the charge, the EEOC may bring a suit in federal court. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. V 1975).
In this suit, the EEOC may seek injunctive relief and make-whole relief, including back
pay for the aggrieved party. A defendant may be found liable for back pay only for the two
years prior to the filing of the charge with the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 200e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
If the EEOC has not filed suit or successfully negotiated a settlement within 180 days of the
filing, the charging party may request notice of the EEOC's failure to file suit or successfully
conciliate and, upon receipt of such notification, may bring a private civil action within 90
days. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp, V 1975). For an outline and general discussion of
EEOC procedures, see Sape & Hart, supra note 5, at 862-64.
EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1976); EEOC v.
Westvaco Corp., 372 F. Supp. 985, 992-93 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Container Corp. of
America, 352 F. Supp. 262, 265 (M.D. Fla. 1972). See 118 CONG. REc. 7563 (1972) (Remarks
of Rep. Perkins) (EEOC should bring suit only when conciliation proves impossible).
Congress intended that an action by an individual complainant under Title VII be free
from the EEOC's "administrative quagmire." H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12,
reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2147-48. Thus, the institution of
private suits is not predicated upon the failure of conciliation. The individual complainant
may sue when the EEOC dismisses his complaint, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V. 1975),
or fails to bring suit within 180 days of the filing of the complaint with the Commission. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See note 7 supra.
' See EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420
U.S. 946 (1975); H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2148. For a table showing delays of four to six and one half
[Vol. XXXV
EEOC TIME LIMITATIONS
arising out of alleged discriminatory acts long past and may be prejudiced
in their defense.' 0 Personnel who were involved in and familiar with the
event on which the suit is based may be unavailable as witnesses." Even
when available, witnesses may have forgotten the details of the event in
question. 2 Further, records pertaining to the event may have been lost
since outdated records are often periodically destroyed in the normal
course of business.' 3 Consequently, EEOC delays in filing suit have
prompted efforts by employers adversely affected by delay to invoke defen-
ses founded upon statutes of limitations, the .doctrine of laches,,4 and the
Administrative Procedure Act.'
5
Defenses based on statutes of limitations have been of two basic types.
First, the language of the 1972 amendments to Title VII'0 has been con-
strued as reflecting a Congressional intent to limit the time period within
which the EEOC may bring suit." Defendant-employers have asserted that
years in several major cases involving the EEOC, see EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 420 F.
Supp. 181, 187 n.7 (E.D. Va. 1976).
The extent of the EEOC's backlog has increased steadily since the Commission was
established. In March of 1975, the Commission had a backlog of 100,000 cases. Totenburg,
Recession's Special Victims: Newly Hired Blacks, Women, N.Y. Times, March 9, 1975, § 4,
at 1, col. 5. By late 1976, the backlog had increased to 124,000 cases. Holsendolph,
Washington & Business: Complaint Backlog at Job Agency, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1976, at
47, col. 5.
10 See, e.g., EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 793 (N.D. Tex. 1976); EEOC
v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 13 FAiR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 792, 793 (E.D. Va. 1976); EEOC v.
American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 187 (E.D. Va. 1976); EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc.,
416 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
" See, e.g., EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1976)
(supervisor and fellow employees of complainant no longer available).
12 See, e.g., EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 793 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (memo-
ries vague after 7-9 years); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 302 (M.D.
Ga. 1975) (key witness elderly and retired).
'1 See, e.g., EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc. 416 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (em-
ployee timecards destroyed after 5 years); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp.
300, 302-03 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (employment records destroyed in course of business).
EEOC regulations require that when a discrimination claim is filed with the Commis-
sion, the employer preserve pertinent records until the expiration of the period in which the
aggrieved employee may file a court suit. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1976). If a suit is filed, records
must be preserved until litigation has ended. Id.
" See text accompanying notes 89-141 infra.
' The Administrative Procedure Act requires federal courts to review the actions of
federal administrative agencies. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). See text accompanying notes 142-77
infra.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975).
'7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) states in pertinent part: -
[If within one hundred and eighty days from the filing of such charge . . . the
Commission has not filed a civil-action under this section, . . . the Commission
* . . shall so notify the person aggrieved and within ninety days after the giving of
such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed
by a member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge alleges was
aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment practice.
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the amendments require the EEOC to file suit, if at all, within 180 days
of the filing of the charge with the Commission.18 The statute provides that
the EEOC must notify the charging party if no suit has been filed during
the 180 day period.' 9 Once this notification has been given, the individual
has a right to bring a private suit within a period of 90 days. 20 When a
private action is brought, the statute expressly provides that the EEOC
may intervene only upon timely application to the court.2 ' Defendant-
employers have argued that since there is no statutory authorization for
EEOC action other than intervention after a private suit has been filed,
the Commission's power is limited to such intervention, and that Congress
did not contemplate suits by the EEOC after expiration of the 180 day
period.
22
Such a construction, however, is inconsistent with a literal reading of
section 2000e-5(f)(1). 23 The language prescribes EEOC procedures with
respect to aggrieved parties at the expiration of the 180 day period. The
section, however, imposes no express limitations on the filing of suits by
the Commission at the end of that time.2 4 The same section of the statute
clearly limits the time within which an individual may file a suit after
receiving his "right to sue" letter.? The clarity of the language limiting
private actions demonstrates conclusively that Congress was capable of
imposing clear, express limitations when it chose to do so. 21 Since there is
no comparable limitation on the time in which the Commission may file
suit, Congress apparently did not intend to impose an 180 day restriction
'O See, e.g., EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1356-57 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 155-57 (4th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975).
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 See, e.g., EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229, 237 (D. Conn. 1976); EEOC
v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 303-04 (M.D. Ga. 1975); EEOC v. Hearst Corp.,
8 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 1270, 1273-74 (W.D. Wash. 1974).
23 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975); see EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d
153, 156 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F.
Supp. 817, 823 (S.D. Iowa 1973); EEOC v. Mobil Oil Corp., 362 F. Supp. 786, 792 (W.D. Mo.
1973); Hunter & Branch, Equal Employment Opportunities: Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Developments Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Act of 1972, 18 How. L. J. 543, 580 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Hunter &
Branch]. Contra, EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 303 (M.D. Ga. 1975)
(absence of express provision for action by EEOC after notification given to aggrieved party
implies that Commission's power to sue terminates upon giving of such notice).
2' 118 CONG. REc. 7565 (1972) (Remarks of Rep. Perkins). See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. V 1975).
, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975), provides that "within ninety days after the
giving of such notice a civil action may be brought against the respondent named in the
charge . . . by the person claiming to be aggrieved .. " The notice to the aggrieved party
is frequently referred to as a "right to sue letter." See Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp., 420
F. Supp. 413, 415 (W.D. Va. 1976); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 303
(M.D. Ga. 1975); Hunter & Branch, supra note 23, at 580.
25 EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1975).
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on the EEOC's enforcement powers.?
A construction of section 2000e-5(f) (1) as imposing a 180 day time limit
on the EEOC's power to bring suit also runs contrary to the legislative
history and policy of the statute.? The remedial measures provided by
Title VII for this problem of national importance would be severely im-
paired by the imposition of an 180 day limit on the EEOC's power to bring
suit.2 19 Since the Commission may not institute a suit until it has made a
determination that reasonable cause exists,"° stalling tactics by defendants
could hinder EEOC investigation and prevent a Commission finding of
reasonable cause within the alleged 180 day limitation period. Such stall-
ing tactics could be as simple as delay in the production of relevent records.
Thus, stalling tactics could render the Commission powerless to take ac-
tion against many violations.2 It is unlikely that Congress intended that
enforcement of Title VII be so easily thwarted.2
Furthermore, there is no indication that Congress, in granting the
EEOC power to bring suit, intended to supplant conciliation as the pri-
mary means for resolving employment discrimination claims." The grant-
ing of the power to bring suits was intended to increase the effectiveness
2 Id.; EEOC v. Bartenders Local 41, 369 F. Supp. 827, 8 29-31 (C.D. Cal. 1973).
2 See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 9, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2138, 2145; Sape & Hart, supra note 5, at 880-81. '
" EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1975).
30 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See EEOC v. Container Corp. of America,
352 F. Supp. 262, 264-65 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
3, EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1975).
32 EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153, 156 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
946 (1975).
1 The 1972 amendments require that the EEOC attempt conciliation before filing suit.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
When Title VII was enacted, conciliation was chosen as the method for dealing with the
employment discrimination problem because of the prevailing view that such discrimination
resulted from numerous isolated incidents between individuals. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2137, 2143-44. The
proponents of Title VII concluded in 1964 that conciliation afforded the EEOC a flexible
means for resolving problems on an individual basis, id., but that court enforcement by the
Commission was an inappropriate means for dealing with the variety of individual situations
that might arise because of the uniformity and rigidity inherent in judicial remedies. Id. The
threat of court enforcement would cause employers to become defensive, thereby hindering
open negotiations. EEOC Hearings on S. 1308 Before Sub-Committee on Employment, Man-
power and Poverty of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 149, 152 (1967) (statement of James Hunt). The need to preserve a record forjudicial
proceedings would further deter effective negotiations. Id.; see note 13 supra.
The notion that conciliation is a flexible, informal means of enforcing Title VII is re-
flected by the EEOC's own internal rules which require that factors such as community
atmosphere, convenience, the number of participants, and the attitude of the respondent be
considered in selecting a location for conciliation meetings. [1976] EEOC COMPL. MAN.
(CCH) 1267.
The proponents of the 1972 amendments, however, asserted that the courts are better
able to deal with the emotional facets of employment discrimination. 118 CONG. RE c. 696,
698 (1972) (Remarks of Sen. Dominick); Peck, supra note 7, at 862-64.
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of the Commission's conciliation efforts. 3 Forcing the EEOC to bring suit
within 180 days of the filing of the charge with the Commission would
impose severe limitations on the conciliation process. Negotiations would
have to terminate within 180 days regardless of whether the EEOC and the
employer were near a settlement.3 5 The advantage of conciliation as a
flexible means of dealing with sensitive problems of employment discrimi-
nation would be lost if negotiations were rushed in the face of an impending
deadline."
In addition, the 1972 amendments were made applicable to charges
pending with the EEOC at the time of enactment. 37 Congress was fully
aware of the Commission's backlog of cases when it enacted the amend-
ments.3 8 Many of the charges pending with the EEOC in 1972 had been
filed two to three years earlier.3 9 The imposition of an 180 day limit on two
to three year old charges would foreclose their use as a basis for enforce-
ment actions. Congress viewed the provisions of Title VII as remedial
measures 0 and the 1972 amendments as an effective way to implement
national policy.4 In view of the prevailing Congressional sentiment, Con-
gress logically would not have chosen to impose retroactively an 180 day
limit on the Commission's power to bring suit.4 2
In Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC,43 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the question whether Title VII imposes an 180 day limit on the
EEOC's right to bring suit. The Court held that the only time limitation
imposed by the express language of the statute on the institution of EEOC
" See 118 CoNG. REc. 696, 697 (1972) (Remarks of Sen. Dominick). But see Hill, supra
note 5, at 83 (EEOC has failed to coordinate conciliation efforts and power to sue).
11 Conciliation attempts frequently take more than 180 days. See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C.
Penney Co., 12 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 640, 642-43 (N.D. Ala. 1975) (17 months).
11 EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
994 (1975).
" Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 14, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWs 2137, 2147; 118 CONG. REC. 696, 697 (1972) (Remarks of Sen. Dominick).
11 H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2147.
' See authorities cited note 27 supra.
" H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2137, 2138.
42 For discussions of the legislative history of the 180 day provision, see EEOC v. E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co., 516 F.2d 1297, 1302 (3d Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark
Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Chris-
tiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1070 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 949 (4th
Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977).
Congress knew the EEOC was taking longer than 180 days to process complaints at the
time of the enactment of the 1972 amendments. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. 12, reprinted in [1972] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2137, 2147; 118 CONG. REc. 696,
697 (1972) (Remarks of Sen. Dominick). Therefore, if the 180 day provision were construed
as a limit on the time in which the EEOC could sue, it would mean that Congress knowingly
imposed conditions on the EEOC that could not possibly be met. EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works,
367 F. Supp. 817, 823 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
13 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977).
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suits restricts the Commission from bringing suit until a minimum of 30
days have elapsed since the charge was filed.4 The Court stated that Title
VII imposes no explicit requirement that the EEOC terminate conciliation
efforts and institute enforcement suits within any specified period of
time.1
5
The Supreme Court recognized that, although the express language of
the statute imposes no 180 day time limit within which the EEOC must
file suit, Congress still might have intended to impose such a limitation. 6
In analyzing the legislative history of the 180 day provision, however, the
Court was unable to discover any evidence of an intent to impose time
limitations on the EEOC's power to bring suit." The Occidental Life hold-
ing accords with the decisions of the majority of the lower courts that have
addressed the issue whether the 180 day provision is a limitation on the
time in which the EEOC may bring suit. 8
The Supreme Court's holding in Occidental Life that the provisions of
Title VII impose no federal statute of limitations on EEOC actions sug-
gests a second defense based on statutes of limitations. Defendant-
employers have argued that the Rules of Decision Act49 requires the adop-
tion of state statutes of limitations whenever federal limitations are ab-
sent." Thus, the district court in which the EEOC brings suit should be
11 Id. at 2451.
~'Id.
' Id. at 2455.
Id. at 2453-54.
" See EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664, 672 (3d Cir. 1976); EEOC v.
Wilson & Co., 535 F.2d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.,
516 F.2d 1297, 1300 (3d Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Louisville & N.R.R., 505 F.2d 610 (5th Cir. 1974);
EEOC v. Cleveland Mills Co., 502 F.2d 153 (4th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 946 (1975);
I.B.E.W., Local Union No. 5 v. EEOC, 398 F.2d 248, 252 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1021 (1969); EEOC v. Western Metal Specialty, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 49, 52-53 (E.D. Wis.
1976); EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229, 236-37 (D. Conn. 1976). But see EEOC
v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 303 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (EEOC may not bring
suit after "right to sue" letter given aggrieved party); EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp.
579, 580-84 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (decision relied solely upon district court decisions subsequently
reversed on appeal).
"1 The Rules of Decision Act provides that the laws of the states shall be applied by
federal courts unless Acts of Congress, the Constitution or treaties of the United States
require otherwise. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1970); see text accompanying notes 49-87 infra.
Pursuant to the Rules of Decision Act, state statutes of limitations have been applied to
actions brought under a variety of federal statutes. International Union, AFL-CIO v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696 (1965) (Labor Management Relations Act); Cope v. Anderson,
331 U.S. 461 (1946) (National Bank Act); Chattanooga Foundry v. Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906) (Sherman Act); Englander Motors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 293 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1961)
(Clayton Act).
50 See, e.g., EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing,
521 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1071-
73 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S.Ct. 2948 (1977); EEOC
v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1973). See generally Hunter & Branch,
supra note 23, at 581-82.
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required to determine the statute of limitations for similar actions in the
state in which it sits, and apply that period of limitation to the EEOC
action.5'
Traditional Supreme Court views on the borrowing of state statutes of
limitations in actions where a federal agency is the plaintiff suggest that
the type of relief sought determines whether the EEOC should be bound
by state statutes of limitations. 2 In United States v. Summerlin,53 the
Federal Housing Administration filed a claim against the administrator of
an estate eleven months after the death of the decedent. Under Florida
law, such claims had to be filed within eight months after death. 4 The
Summerlin Court ruled that the United States is not bound by state stat-
utes of limitations when enforcing a public right in its capacity as a sover-
eign government.5 On the other hand, if the United States sues primarily
to benefit a private individual, there is no governmental immunity to state
statutes of limitations."
This distinction between suits by the government to enforce public and
private rights was originally expounded in United States v. Beebe.5" There,
the defendant had acquired a land patent from a United States land office
by coercion and misrepresentation. The government's suit to set aside the
issuance of the patent, if successful, would have enabled the rightful pri-
vate owners to obtain a patent for the land.59 The Supreme Court found
that the United States was serving merely as a "conduit" through which
private individuals were being allowed to sue other private individuals,
and that rules aimed at protecting the rights of the sovereign were inappos-
ite."0 The Court held that when acting to enforce private rights, the United
51 Difficulty in identifying the proper state statute of limitations to apply has led to the
application of a variety of types of state statutes of limitations, to Title VII back pay actions.
See EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 458 n.4 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 521 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1975) (Alabama one year limit on non-contractual actions arising out of injuries
to the person or rights of another); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 924
n.23 (5th Cir. 1973) (Georgia two year limit on recovery of wages); EEOC v. Christiansburg
Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1071 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977) (Virginia two year limit on actions for personal injuries).
5' See text accompanying notes 53-61 infra.
310 U.S. 414 (1940).
Id. at 415.
Id. at 416. The rule that the United States is not bound by state statutes of limitations
when enforcing its rights is derived from the sovereign privileges of English Kings. Guaranty
Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938). See also text accompanying notes 101-
05 infra.
-4 United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 347 (1888).
127 U.S. 338 (1888).
Id. at 338-39. The land was no longer the property of the federal government at the
time the patent was illegally obtained by Beebe, but had previously been conveyed to other
parties. Id.
11 Id. at 343. The suit had been instituted on the urging of the legal owners of the land
who had been unable to obtain a land patent because of the patent held by Beebe. Id. at 340.
w Id. at 347.
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States is subject to state statutes of limitations.'
The public-private rights distinction is easily applicable to EEOC ac-
tions. The EEOC is authorized to bring suits seeking injunctive relief, back
pay relief, or both. 2 When the Commission seeks injunctive relief, it is
acting to implement a national policy. 3 An injunction against future dis-
crimination by an employer benefits not only the individual complainant,
but also a large class of people." The rationale of Summerlin is thus applic-
able to such suits.65 EEOC suits for back pay, however, are subject to
different considerations. Although an agency of the federal government is
the plaintiff, back pay relief is awarded directly to aggrieved persons ac-
cording to individual entitlement to such relief.6 The EEOC functions as
a "'conduit," merely passing money from the defendant to the complain-
ant. Arguably, Beebe should apply and state statutes of limitations should
apply to EEOC suits for back pay."7
I' d.
92 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). See note 7 supra.
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 535 F.2d 533, 537 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 97 S. Ct.
2447 (1977); EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 521
F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1071-
73 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert: granted, 97 S.Ct. 2948 (1977); EEOC
v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1973); cf. EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369
F. Supp. 579, 587 (N.D. Ala. 1974) (small number of complainants affected and size of facility
involved limited effect of injunction to extent it vindicated only private rights; Alabama
statute of limitations applied).
" Clayton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 419 F. Supp. 28, 29 (C.D. Cal. 1976).
See, e.g., EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing,
521 F.2d 273 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1071-
72 (W.D. Va. 1974), affd, 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977); EEOC
v. Eagle Iron Works, 367 F. Supp. 817, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1973). One writer, however, suggests
that the type of relief sought is of no consequence in determining whether state statutes of
limitations are applicable. Note, Limitation Period for Filing Under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 56 B.U.L. REv. 760, 760-61 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Limitation Period
for Filing Under Title VII]. Although the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V
1975) do not act to limit the time in which suits may be filed by the EEOC, the limitations
imposed on the time for filing with the Commission and for notification of the defendant of
the filing of the charge were regarded by Congress as sufficient protection for defendants.
Limitation Period for Filing Under Title VII, supra note 65, at 760-61. Defendants are
promptly made aware of the possibility that a suit may be brought so that a defense can be
planned. Thus, defendants are protected from having to defend against surprise suits and no
other statutes of limitations apply. Id. The Supreme Court expressed similar views in Occi-
dental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447, 2458 (1977). See note 125 infra.
Interim earnings of the aggrieved party are deducted from the amount of back pay
relief awarded. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975). Furthermore, the income that the
aggrieved party could have earned with reasonable diligence in the period between the filing
of the charge and the trial is subtracted from back pay awards. Id.
11 Courts have recognized that requiring employers to pay back pay awards promotes the
policy of insuring equal employment opportunities, but have found the direct benefit to the
individual more significant and held that Title VII back pay suits vindicate private rights.
See, e.g., EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1072-73 (W.D. Va. 1974),
afV'd, 550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works,
367 F. Supp. 817, 823-24 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
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In Occidental,8 however, the Supreme Court did not distinguish be-
tween injunctive and back pay relief. Instead, the Court considered EEOC
actions to be simple "enforcement suits," 9 reasoning that state legislatures
do not consider national interests when devising statutes of limitations and
that federal courts have a duty to insure that the application of state
statutes of limitations does not interfere with the implementation of na-
tional policies." The Court noted that Congress had increased the EEOC's
workload in 1972 despite awareness of its backlog of pending cases.7 1 Be-
cause state statutes of limitations might easily run before the EEOC could
bring suit, the Court concluded that absorption of state statutes of limita-
tions would be inconsistent with the intent of Congress to provide effective
remedies for employment discrimination.7 Therefore, the Court held that
EEOC suits, whether for injunctive relief or back pay, are not subject to
state statutes of limitations.
73
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for its
departure from the traditional public-private right analysis. 74 Citing
Summerlin and Beebe, Rehnquist applied the traditional public-private
right analysis and determined that the right to back pay relief is a private
right because the individual complainants can bring back pay suits if the
EEOC chooses not to do so. 75 Furthermore, Rehnquist noted that sums
recovered in back pay suits accrue to the benefit of individuals rather than
the federal treasury, with the EEOC functioning as a conduit for private
litigants.76 Because EEOC suits for back pay vindicate private rights,
Rehnquist concluded that state statutes of limitations should apply to
such suits.
77
Rehnquist also determined that, although an EEOC action for injunc-
tive relief may further Congressional policy, virtually every suit brought
by the government advances some Congressional policy.78 A determination
that an action furthers some national policy alone, therefore, should not
be sufficient to qualify the action as one to vindicate a public right.7 9
- 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977).
0 Id. at 2458.
7 Id. at 2455. State statutes of limitations would interfere with national policy because
the EEOC would be subjected to nonuniform time restrictions resulting in confusion in
enforcement measures. Clayton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 419 F. Supp. 28, 29 (C.D. Cal.
1976). Furthermore, application of state statutes of limitations to EEOC suits would lead to
a lack of uniformity in enforcement of Title VII. Charges alleging facts identical to those on
which a suit was brought in one state could be barred by a shorter limitations period in
another state. Id. For examples of the varying state limitations periods that might be im-
posed, see note 51 supra.
7' 97 S. Ct. at 2456.
"Id.
SId.
" Id. at 2461-62 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
' Id. at 2463.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 2462.
7' Id. at 2463.
'Id.
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Rehnquist noted that there is no tangible benefit to the government real-
ized by EEOC suits for injunctions,0 and concluded that EEOC suits for
injunctive or back pay relief should be subject to state statutes of limita-
tions.
8
The Occidental Court's ruling that the EEOC is immune from state
statutes of limitations in suits for injunctions is consistent with the conclu-
sions of the majority of the lower courts that have considered the issue. 2
The Court's refusal to examine back pay and injunctive relief separately,
however, represents a significant departure from circuit and district court
approaches." Holding that an action is immune to state statutes of limita-
tions regardless of whether the public or a private individual directly bene-
fits, so long as the action yields some abstract public benefit, has serious
implications. As Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissenting opinion,
all suits brought by the government confer some public benefit., Under the
Occidental rationale, therefore, all suits brought by the government could
be immune to state statutes of limitations. Furthermore, exempting what
is otherwise a private right from state statutes of limitations solely because
some public benefit is derived from it is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's own past treatment of similar rights conferred by the Civil Rights
Act of 1870." The Court has recognized that a private action under the Act
furthers a national policy and benefits the public." Nonetheless, a suit
AO Id.
11 Id. at 2463-64.
12 EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 521 F.2d
223 (5th Cir. 1975); EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1359 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 994 (1975); Clayton v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 419 F. Supp. 28, 29 (C.D.
Cal. 1976); EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562, 573 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1071-73 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd,
550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977); EEOC v. Eagle Iron Works, 367
F. Supp. 817, 824 (S.D. Iowa 1973); EEOC v. Duff Bros., Inc., 364 F. Supp. 405, 406-07 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973); Hunter & Branch, supra note 23, at 581-82; cf. Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp.,
420 F. Supp. 413, 415 (W.D. Va. 1976) (decision not based on governmental immunity from
state statutes of limitations when government enforcing public rights, but on presence of
limitations in Title VII; since federal statute of limitations provided, state statutes of limita-
tions do not apply). Contra, EEOC v. Union Oil Co., 369 F. Supp. 579, 588 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
" Many lower courts, citing United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940), and
United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888), have examined the elements of EEOC suits in
order to determine whether public or private rights are being enforced, see text accompanying
notes 52-67 supra, and concluded that since back pay suits directly benefit individuals, the
EEOC's right to bring such suits is circumscribed by state statutes of limitations. See EEOC
v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 521 F.2d 223, 225 (5th
Cir. 1975); EEOC v. National Cash Register Co., 405 F. Supp. 562, 573 (N.D. Ga. 1975);
EEOC v. Christiansburg Garment Co., 376 F. Supp. 1067, 1071-73 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd,
550 F.2d 949 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 2948 (1977); EEOC v. Eagle Iron-Works, 367
F. Supp. 817, 823-24 (S.D. Iowa 1973).
m 97 S. Ct. at 2463 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
- 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970). Section 1981 guarantees to all persons the same rights enjoyed
by white citizens to make and enforce contracts. Id.
n Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 472 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring
and dissenting).
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under the Civil Rights Act of 1870 is a private action and is subject to state
statutes of limitations."1
The Occidental decision, therefore, represents a radical departure from
precedent with potentially far-reaching effects. The Court's willingness to
take such a step indicates a tendency to be sympathetic to the policies
behind Title VII and to facilitate EEOC enforcement efforts.
88
The differentiation between actions to enforce public rights and those
aimed at vindicating the rights of private individuals is equally important
in an analysis of the availability of a defense of laches to EEOC actions.
Laches is an equitable defense.89 The defense of laches can be invoked
where the plaintiffs delay in enforcing a legal right has been unreasona-
ble,90 and, as a result, the defendant is prejudiced in his defense.9 The
37 Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. at 461-64. The ends served by back pay
awards under Title VII and § 1981 are virtually identical. See Johnson v. Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 491 F.2d 1364, 1378-79 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the § 1981 remedy was available
long before the enactment of Title VII, the time period for assessing back pay liability under
§ 1981 has been limited to the effective date of Title VII because there was no clear indication
that employers could be held liable for employment discrimination until the enactment of
the latter statute. Id. at 1378.
Despite the similarity of § 1981 and Title VII back pay suits and the public benefit
derived from § 1981 back pay suits, the Supreme Court held that § 1981 actions are subject
to state statutes of limitations. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975).
If § 1981 back pay actions are subject to state statutes of limitations, the similarity of the
remedies under § 1981 and Title VII should require that back pay relief under Title VII also
be subject to such limitations.
Justice Rehnquist pointed out the inconsistency between the Court's treatment of the
application of state statutes of limitations to § 1981 and Title VII actions in his dissenting
opinion in Occidental. 97 S. Ct. at 2460 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). He noted that public
benefit had not been sufficient to permit the characterization of the § 1981 suit in Johnson
v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), as one to vindicate public rights, and that
by making such a characterization in Occidental, the Court broke with precedent. 97 S. Ct.
at 2462 n.4 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Note, Filing of an Employment Discrimination
Charge Under Title VII as Tolling the Statute of Limitations Applicable to a 1981 Action:
The Unanswered Questions of Johnson v. REA, 26 CASE W. L. Ray. 889, 904-16 (1976), tracing
the historical development of factors mandating exemption from state statutes of limitations
in justifying the outcome in Johnson. Three factors, including fundamental differences in
federal and state policies, federal legislative pronouncements, and traditional federal judicial
spheres of action, are identified as having been determinative in prior court decisions holding
actions exempt from state statutes of limitations. Id. at 904. None of these factors is applica-
ble to § 1981 back pay actions. Id. at 904-16. Since back pay actions under § 1981 and Title
VII serve the same ends, it follows that Title VII back pay actions also should be bound by
state statutes of limitations.
M Judicial regard for the importance of the national policy to provide equal employment
opportunity has resulted in a "procedural bias" in favor of the EEOC in Title VII suits.
Protection for Both Parties?, supra note 7, at 372. Courts have read Title VII broadly in order
to strengthen the statute's remedial effect. Id.
" EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229, 236 (D. Conn. 1976). Laches is defined
as "an equity doctrine to the effect that unreasonable delay will bar a claim if the delay is a
prejudice to the defendant." D. DoBsS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REmE Is § 2.3 (1973).
90 Whether a delay has been unreasonable depends upon the facts of the particular case.
2 J. POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 419c (5th ed. 1941) [hereinafter cited
as PomRoy]. See EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 12 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 640, 641 (N.D. Ala.
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availability of defenses based on both laches and statutes of limitations
stems from policy determinations that the filing of stale claims should be
discouraged; and that defendants should be spared the hardship of having
to prepare a defense when essential testimony and evidence are no longer
available.2 The application of the two defenses, however, is quite differ-
ent.
9 3
A statute of limitations defense can be invoked whenever the selected
statutory time period has passed. 4 Blanket application of such time limits
is inflexible and can result in dismissal of suits in which the factors of
staleness and hardship to the defendant, both of which underlie the enact-
ment of statutes of limitations, are absent. 5 The defense of laches, by
contrast, cannot be invoked automatically upon the fulfillment of arbitrary
criteria. Passage of time alone is insufficient.9" Unreasonable delay and
resulting prejudice to the defendant both must be present before the de-
fense of laches can be invoked. 8
1975) (after long delay, inequitable to require defendant to prepare defense).
11 The existence of prejudice depends on the facts of the particular case. PoMEnoy, supra
note 90, § 419d at 179-80. In Akers v. State Marine Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965),
the court held that dismissal based on a defense of laches required that balance of equities
weigh in favor of defendant. Id. at 220. Passage of over three years between date of injury to
plaintiff and institution of suit against employer was insufficient to allow invocation of
defense of laches. In order to shift balance, defendant must show prejudice. Id. Akers subse-
quently has been cited for the same proposition in EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F.
Supp. 300, 302 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
See PoMmoy, supra note 90, at § 418.
Id. at § 419b.
"Id.
,3 The rigid application of statutes of limitations does not permit consideration of
whether claims are just or unjust, or whether delays are justified. See POMEROY, supra note
90, at § 419b. Defendants may bring about the dismissal of actions against them by stalling
until the statutory period has expired. EEOC v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 517 F.2d
1297, 1301 (3d Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 30-31 supra.
" The nature of a defense of laches requires that there be a case-by-case determination
of whether there has been unreasonable delay by the plaintiff and resulting prejudice to the
defendant. POMEROY, supra note 90, at § 419b-d.
" EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 12 FAmi EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 640, 641 (N.D. Ala. 1975). See
notes 89-91 supra.
' A case-by-case examination in order to determine whether prejudice is present requires
the courts to consider the plight of the defendant. The inequities faced by the defendant
prejudiced by unreasonable delay may override the "procedural bias" in favor of the EEOC.
See Protection for Both Parties?, supra note 7, at 372. In EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank,
420 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Va. 1976), the court described the inequitable position of the defen-
dant unable to know whether he might face a lawsuit based on old charges. Id. at 184-85.
Finding the conditions of unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice to the defendant pres-
ent, the court held that the EEOC's action was barred by a defense "in the nature of laches."
Id. at 188.
The possibility of frustration of the policy against employment discrimination is mini-
mized because the EEOC is not bound by rigid time limits, but is free to take whatever time '
it-deems necessary to process a charge, as long as the grounds for delay are not unreasonable.
Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1972). Defendants must show that
they have been prejudiced by the delay and therefore cannot defeat EEOC suits by dilatory
tactics. EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 186 (E.D. Va. 1976).
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In United States v. Kirkpatrick,99 the Supreme Court decided that a
defense of laches cannot be invoked against the federal government. In
Kirkpatrick, the government sued bond obligees for debts that were due
eight to ten years before institution of the suit."' The Court reasoned that
public policy required safeguarding the public treasury. Because the duty
of safeguarding the treasury fell upon numerous government agents, effec-
tive supervision was impossible and delays in suing for debts owed to the
treasury were inevitable."' Permitting a defense of laches against govern-
ment suits to collect such debts would deprive the treasury of monies owed
and thereby damage the public. 0 The Court therefore held that a defense
of laches was not available in suits by the federal government.' 3 In United
States v. Beebe,"04 however, the Court held that the policy reasons behind
government immunity from a defense of laches were inapplicable when a
government agency acted as a conduit in seeking to enforce private rights,
and that when the government acted in such a capacity, the government's
suits were subject to a defense of laches."°5
Initial discussion of the application of the doctrine of laches to Title VII
actions appeared as dictum in decisions in which the issue whether the
defense of laches could be invoked was collateral.'' In United States v.
Georgia Power Co.,"17 the issue was whether a Title VII action brought by
the Attorney General was subject to the Georgia statute of limitations."'
The Fifth Circuit held that Title VII back pay suits vindicated private
rights and were therefore subject to state statutes of limitations."' The
court also noted that, "as is true with regard to wholly equitable actions,
the doctrine of laches is applicable to such monetary awards."'
In EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co.,'" the Fifth Circuit analyzed an action
brought by the EEOC and found that a suit for back pay relief enforced
private rights."' The court held that EEOC back pay suits were subject to
the Alabama statute of limitations, but that suits for injunctive relief were
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720 (1824).
11o Id. at 735.
101 Id. at 722.
102 Id.
1o Id.; accord, United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 416 (1940).
104 127 U.S. 338 (1888).
"I Id. at 347; see text accompanying notes 57-61 supra.
10 EEOC v. Griffin Wheel Co., 511 F.2d 456, 459 n.5 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 521
F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 923 (5th Cir. 1973).
" 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973).
Id. at 922. The suit alleged that tests used by Georgia Power as a basis for determining
whom to hire or promote discriminated against blacks. Id. at 910-11.
'o' Id. at 923-24.
,,0 Id. at 923.
" 511 F.2d 456 (5th Cir.), aff'd on rehearing, 521 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1975). In Griffin
Wheel, the EEOC alleged that the company discriminated in hiring and disciplining employ-
ees, by maintaining separate facilities for black employees, and by failing to take affirmative
action to remedy past discrimination. 511 F.2d at 458 n.2.
"1 511 F.2d at 459.
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not."' However, despite its evident concern with the public-private right
distinction and its determination that EEOC suits for injunctions vindi-
cate a public right, the court stated that EEOC suits for injunctive relief
were subject to a defense of laches."4 The determination that a defense of
laches is available in EEOC suits for injunctions spawned several cases
relying on that conclusion."5
In EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., " the Middle District of Georgia
assumed that a defense of laches could be invoked in suits brought by the
EEOC,"17 and limited itself to determining whether the facts of the case
indicated the presence of the elements of inexcusable delay and preju-
dice.1 18 The complainant had filed a charge with the EEOC claiming that
she had been discharged because of her race."' Five and one half years after
the discharge, the EEOC filed a suit based on the charge.2 0 To show that
its discharge of the complainant was justified on non-racial grounds, C &
D needed to present testimony about the altercation that had precipitated
the discharge. Such testimony, however, was unavailable' and records
,,3 Id. The Griffin Wheel court based its determination on the application of the rules of
United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414 (1940), and United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338
(1888). 511 F.2d at 458.
"1 511 F.2d at 459 n.5. The Griffin Wheel court relied on United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 906 (5th Cir. 1973), as authority for its holding that a defense of laches could
be invoked in EEOC suits for injunctive relief. 511 F.2d at 459 n.5.
Not only is the Griffin Wheel court's statement that EEOC suits for injunctions are
subject to a defense of laches inconsistent with that court's earlier determination that EEOC
suits for injunctions vindicate public rights, EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc. 416 F. Supp. 1002,
1004 n.1 (N.D. Ga. 1976); see text accompanying notes 111-13 supra, but citing Georgia Power
for the proposition that EEOC suits for injunctive relief are subject to a defense of laches
ignores the fact that Georgia Power spoke only of application of such a defense to Title VII
back pay suits. United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 923 (5th Cir. 1973).
III In a decision that preceded Georgia Power and Griffin Wheel, the Fifth Circuit stated
that EEOC actions were not subject to a defense of laches. In Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC,
465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972), the court said, "[n]or is the equitable doctrine of laches
applicable to a governmental agency acting to vindicate a public right. "Id. at 746 (emphasis
supplied). That statement, however, is apparently dictum, as were contrary statements in
Georgia Power and Griffin Wheel. The Chromcraft court based its decision on the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act rather than the availability of a defense of laches. Id. at 746-47. Fur-
thermore, had laches been an issue, the Fifth Circuit's reference to the concept of public
rights leaves open the possibility that the court would have held that a defense of laches can
be invoked in EEOC suits for back pay. Id. at 746. Chromcraft would, at most, preclude
indiscriminate application of the defense of laches without regard for the type of relief sought.
See text accompanying notes 113-38 infra.
"1 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
117 The C & D court cited the footnote in Griffin Wheel, 511 F.2d 456, 459 n.5, as authority
that a defense of laches could be invoked in EEOC suits. 398 F. Supp. at 302.
,,8 Id. See text accompanying notes 89-91 supra.
'" 398 F. Supp. at 301. The suit arose out of an altercation between the complainant, a
Negro employee, and the president of C & D. Id. Complainant was sent home pending C &
D's investigation of the incident. During the investigation, complainant accused C & D of
having sent her home because the company had a racist attitude. She was discharged follow-
ing the accusation. Id.
' Id. at 302.
,2, Id. The testimony of the president would have been essential. At the time of the suit,
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pertaining to complainant's discharge had been destroyed.' 2 Furthermore,
the EEOC had issued a right to sue letter to the complainant and notified
C & D that a civil action might be brought within 90 days.' 3 The court
found that C & D reasonably could have concluded that no action would
be brought upon the expiration of the 90 day period.' 4 The court concluded
that the five and one half year delay, the prejudice to C & D resulting from
the unavailability of evidence, and C & D's reasonable belief that no suit
would be brought were sufficient to justify a defense of laches.'1
In EEOC v. J. C. Penney Co., "I the EEOC's suit contained charges that
J.C. Penney discriminated against Negroes in determining work schedules,
promoting employees and establishing job classifications.'2 The Northern
District of Alabama found the Commission's delay in processing the charge
unreasonable because the EEOC waited until after the completion of pro-
cessing of similar charges, filed up to six months later by Penney employ-
ees, before processing the charge serving as the basis for the suit.'2 The
court found that the defendant was prejudiced because the regional direc-
tor of the EEOC, three times during a four year period prior to the institu-
tion of the suit, had determined that the charges serving as the basis for
the suit were not supported by reasonable cause.'29 Notwithstanding these
prior determinations, the EEOC approved the charges and filed suit.'30 The
court concluded that requiring the Penney Company to defend against four
year old charges when the EEOC had determined on three occasions that
there had been no discrimination would be grossly inequitable.'3 ' Because
both unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice were present, the district
court held that the EEOC's suit, seeking injunctive relief, was barred by
he was 75 years of age and retired from the company. Id. He would have had to testify
concerning events that had occurred almost six years before. Id.
122 Id. at 302-03. Complainant had been issued a "right to sue letter" three years before
the institution of the EEOC's suit. She had not instituted a private action. Id. at 303. EEOC
regulations permit the destruction of pertinent records upon the expiration of complainant's
right to bring a private action. 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14 (1976). See note 13 supra. The period in
which a private action could have been brought had expired nearly three years before the
EEOC brought suit. 398 F. Supp. at 302-03.
123 398 F. Supp. at 302-03.
,24 Id. at 303.
'1 Id. In Occidental, the Supreme Court suggested that the requirements that the EEOC
notify the defendant of the filing of the charge within 10 days, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b),
(e) (Supp. V 1975); note 7 supra, and that the Commission keep the defendant informed of
the progress of the case during administrative proceedings, see 29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.91b(b),
1601.23, 1601.25 (1976), protects against prejudice resulting from failing memory or unavaila-
ble evidence in most cases. 97 S. Ct. 2447, 2458 (1977). Once notified of the filing of the charge
with the EEOC, employers would have the opportunity to gather and preserve evidence that
might be needed to defend against a lawsuit. Id.
"1 12 FAiR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 640 (N.D. Ala. 1975).
'I Id. at 641.
I d.
Id. at 642.
130 Id.
131 Id.
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a defense of laches 3 2
Traditional analysis 33 indicates that an approach to the question of
availability of laches as a defense in EEOC actions first requires a determi-
nation of whether there is an unreasonable delay on the part of the Com-
mission. 3 1 Where such a delay is present, a court must then examine the
facts of the case to determine whether the necessary second element of
resulting prejudice to the defendant is also present.ln Where both unrea-
sonable delay and resulting prejudice are found, the type of relief sought
determines the availability of a defense of laches. If injunctive relief is
sought, the defense should not be available. Injunctive relief vindicates a
public right'3 and suits for such relief should be immune from a defense
of laches.' 37 Where, on the other hand, the relief sought is back pay, the
EEOC would be acting as a conduit for a suit by a private individual and
the defense of laches should be available.'1'
Recent decisions, however, indicate that the type of relief sought is not
determinative of the issue of availability of a defense of laches. Opinions
holding that a defense of laches is available in EEOC suits have not made
the public-private right distinction.' Furthermore, in Occidental, the
Supreme Court's refusal to distinguish between the enforcement of public
"I Id. The Penney court did not indicate why EEOC suits should be subject to a defense
of laches. The court simply stated that a defense of laches was available whenever unreasona-
ble delay made it inequitable to allow the suit. Id. at 641.
Other courts have found that EEOC suits both for injunctions and back pay could be
barred by laches if sufficient prejudice were shown. Askins v. Imperial Reading Corp., 420 F.
Supp. 413, 415-16 (W.D. Va. 1976); EEOC v. Nicholson File Co., 408 F. Supp. 229, 236 (D.
Conn. 1976); cf. EEOC v. North Hills Passavant Hosp., 544 F.2d 664, 673 (3d Cir. 1976) (since
EEOC informed defendant of charge and filed suit within 10 months after conciliation failed,
delay in filing suit not unreasonable and, therefore, court need not decide whether defense of
laches available as matter of law in event unreasonable delay occurs).
More recent courts have refused to hold that a defense of laches is available in EEOC
suits. EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 790 (N.D. Tex. 1976); EEOC v. Moore
Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002, 1004 (N.D. Ga. 1976). These opinions did not analyze whether
a defense of laches should be available, but were limited to an examination of precedents in.
order to determine if the reasoning of the earlier decisions adequately supported a holding
that such a defense is available. See text accompanying notes 159-69 infra.
'1 Traditional analysis of the availability of a defense of laches centers on the public-
private right distinction propounded in United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888). See text
accompanying notes 104-05 supra. The recent Supreme Court decision in Occidental Life Ins.
Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977),'indicates that the public-private right distinction may
no longer be valid. See text accompanying notes 139-41 infra.
' See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 12 FAIR EmPL. PRAc. CAs. 640, 641-42 (N.D. Ala.
1975); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 302-03 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
' Id.
'3' See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
,3 United States v. Kirkpatrick, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 720, 735 (1824). See text accompany-
ing notes 99-103 supra.
'" United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338, 347 (1888). See text accompanying notes 104-
05 supra.
"I, See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 12 FAIR EmPL. PRAc. CAs. 640 (N.D. Ala. 1975);
EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
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and private rights in holding that EEOC suits are not subject to state
statutes of limitations, together with the clear statement that courts are
free to exercise discretion to deny or limit relief in EEOC suits, suggest that
the public-private right distinction also should be abrogated in determin-
ing whether EEOC suits are subject to a defense of laches.11" A defense of
laches, therefore, may be available in EEOC suits, regardless of the type
of relief sought, whenever both unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice
to the defendant are present.'
Unreasonable delay alone has been asserted as sufficient grounds for
invoking the third defense to an EEOC action. This defense is predicated
upon a construction of the language of the Administrative Procedure Act'
that would empower courts to apply the Act to bar actions by the EEOC
in cases where Commission delays have been unreasonable."'
In Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC,'I the Fifth Circuit considered the ques-
tion whether the Administrative Procedure Act empowered the court to set
aside the EEOC's demand for evidence."' The EEOC had not notified
"I The public-private right distinction is equally important in determining whether an
action by a United States government agency is subject to state statutes of limitations or a
defense of laches. See text accompanying notes 89-105 supra. In Occidental, while holding
that statutes of limitations cannot be invoked as defenses in EEOC suits, the Supreme Court
indicated in dicta that a defense based on the doctrine of laches could be permitted. The
Court cited language in Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), recognizing that
the courts have a "discretionary power" to restrict or deny back pay relief in Title VII suits
when a private plaintiff's unexcused conduct prejudices the defendant. 97 S. Ct. at 2458. The
Court went on to state that the same power can be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff.
Id. The "discretionary power" recognized in Moody, while never labelled laches by the major-
ity, was construed as such by Justice Marshall in his concurring opinion. 422 U.S. at 440
(Marshall, J. concurring). Although Moody dealt solely with back pay suits, reference to it
in Occidental, wherein the distinction between injunctive and back pay relief was abrogated,
indicates that the discretionary power of the courts recognized in Moody could be applied to
EEOC suits regardless of the type of relief sought. See 97 S. Ct. at 2458.
,, See text accompanying notes 116-32 supra.
,,2 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). The Administrative Procedure Act states in pertinent part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall
decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provi-
sions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency action.
The reviewing court shall-
1) Compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed....
In making the foregoing determinations. . . due account shall be taken of the
rule of prejudicial error.
143 See, e.g., Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972); EEOC v. Bell
Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 790-93 (N.D. Tex. 1976); EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank,
420 F. Supp. 181, 186-87 (E.D. Va. 1976); EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002,
1004 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
'" 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972).
," Id. at 746-47. The EEOC's demand for evidence was an exercise of the investigatory
powers vested in the Commission by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9 (Supp. V 1975). 465 F.2d at 746.
The EEOC has the same investigatory powers vested in the National Labor Relations Board
by 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-9(a) (Supp. V 1975). The EEOC is therefore
empowered to demand the production of evidence relating to matters under investigation by
the Commission. 29 U.S.C. § 161 (1970).
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Chromcraft of the charge until more than a year after the charge had been
filed with the Commission.' The court construed the language of the Act
requiring the reviewing court to take account of the rules of prejudicial
error'47 as allowing a defense founded on the Act to be invoked on a showing
of prejudice to the defendant resulting from the EEOC's unreasonable
delay.' The Chromcraft court determined that the EEOC's delay had
been caused both by the Commission's backlog and an intentional effort
to protect the employee against reprisals by his employer.' Therefore, the
delay had not resulted from a "dilatory attitude" on the part of the Com-
mission and was not unreasonable.' Since the necessary element of unrea-
sonable delay had not been shown, the court held that Chromcraft could
not avail itself of a defense under the Administrative Procedure Act.',
In EEOC v. Exchange Security Bank,"' the Fifth Circuit concluded
that a defense based on the Administrative Procedure Act5 required a
showing of both unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice."4 Further-
more, the Exchange Security Bank court held that the passage of time
alone was not sufficient to constitute unreasonable delay."5 The court
required a showing of a dilatory attitude on the part of the EEOC before a
delay could be found unreasonable under the Act."' Because the bank had
465 F.2d at 746.
" See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976); note 142 supra.
465 F.2d at 747. "Prejudicial error," as construed by the court in Chromcraft, is
apparently the same as resulting prejudice to the defendant necessary for a defense of laches.
Such a reading does not accord with other courts' interpretations equating the "prejudicial
error" requirement with traditional standards of review by appellate courts. See, e.g., Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. CAB., 379 F.2d 453, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976) embodies
'harmless error' principle announced for our general jurisprudence by decisions and stat-
ute").
The necessity that unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice be shown in order to
invoke either a defense of laches or a defense based on the Administrative Procedure Act has
caused several courts to find the two defenses indistinguishable. EEOC v. Exchange Security
Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1976); EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp.
181 (E.D. Va. 1976).
" 465 F.2d at 748.
150 Id.
"' Id. at 748-49. The Chromcraft court noted that the Act imposed limitations on judicial
review, id. at 747; see text accompanying notes 173-76 infra., and only authorized the courts
to compel agency action. 465 F.2d at 747; see text accompanying notes 173-74 infra. Further-
more, the court noted that, in seeking to set aside the Commission's demand for evidence,
Chromcraft sought nullification rather than compulsion of agency action. 465 F.2d at 747.
The court did not resolve whether the Act could ever be invoked as a defense to an EEOC
action, but aisumed that the Act was applicable and analyzed the statutory language to
determine what elements must be shown to invoke a defense founded on the Act. Id.
152 529 F.2d 1214 (5th Cir. 1976).
"s 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
"' 529 F.2d at 1216. The Exchange Security Bank court engaged in no analysis of its own,
but relied solely on Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745 (5th Cr. 1972), as authority
for holding that unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice were necessary to invoke a defense
of laches. 529 F.2d at 1216-17.
03 Id.
"I Id. at 1216. The Exchange Security Bank court cited Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465
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relied solely on the element of time, the Fifth Circuit held that the EEOC's
suit was not barred.'
57
Subsequent opinions adhere to the two-part test set out in Exchange
Security Bank in determining whether EEOC actions should be barred
under the Administrative Procedure Act.'5 Courts differ, however, on what
constitutes a showing of unreasonable delay and prejudice.
In EEOC v. Moore Group, Inc.,'" the Northern District of Georgia held
that because five years had passed between the filing of the charge with
the EEOC and the institution of suit by the Commission, and charges
other than those upon which the suit was based had received more expedi-
tious processing, unreasonable delay had occurred sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act. ' The court further
held that the defendant had been prejudiced as a result of the delay be-
cause the complainant's former supervisor and fellow employees who could
testify about the events from which charges of discrimination arose were
no longer employed by Moore Group.'"' In addition, employee time cards
for the period in which the events occurred had been destroyed.' 2 Since
both unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice were present, the court
concluded that it had authority under the Administrative Procedure Act
to bar the EEOC's action.13
F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972) as the basis for the dilatory attitude requirement. 529 F.2d at 1216.
,'7 Id. at 1216-17.
,"' See, e.g., EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 791 (N.D. Tex. 1976); EEOC
v. Moore Group, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
,5, 416 F. Supp. 1002 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
" Id. at 1005; cf. EEOC v. J. C. Penney Co., 12 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAS. 640, 642 (N.D.
Ala. 1975) (more expeditious processing of later charges indicated delay unreasonable and
defense of laches, therefore, available).
The Moore Group court questioned whether reliance on the extent of the EEOC's backlog
could constitute sufficient justification for delay. 416 F. Supp. at 1005. But see Chromcraft
Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 748 (5th Cir. 1972) (delay caused solely by EEOC backlog
reasonable, therefore, defense based on Administrative Procedure Act unavailable).
"1 416 F. Supp. at 1005. The Moore Group court rejected the Commission's argument
that the company could not claim prejudice caused by unavailability of witnesses when one
witness could be procured without unreasonable effort. Id.
"I Id. The Moore Group court rejected the EEOC's argument that the company could
not claim that it had been prejudiced in its-defense by its own destruction of pertinent records
since Moore Group destroyed the records in the normal course of business and could have
assumed reasonably that no action would be brought. Id.; cf. EEOC v. C & D Sportswear
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 303 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (defendant prejudiced when company destroyed
records with reasonable belief no action would be brought). But cf. EEOC v. American Nat'l
Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 186 (E.D. Va. 1976) (when invoking defense "in the nature of laches"
defendant cannot be prejudiced by his own acts).
163 416 F. Supp. at 1005-06. The Moore Group court, however, also found that the reason-
ing in prior cases was insufficient to support a holding that a defense of laches should be
available in an EEOC suit. Id. at 1004. The court recognized that the statement in Georgia
Power that a defense of laches was available in Title VII suits was dictum. Id. at 1004 n.1.
The court also discussed the inherent inconsistency in the analysis of the public-private right
question in Griffin Wheel and the Griffin Wheel court's subsequent conclusion that EEOC
suits for injunctions were subject to a defense of laches. Id. See text accompanying note 114
supra. The Moore Group court did not analyze the issue of availability of a defense of laches
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A similar conclusion was reached by the Northern District of Texas in
EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co.,"4 in which the Commission alleged discrimi-
nation by Bell against Negroes and Spanish surnamed individuals in hir-
ing, promotion and firing practices."5 The suit was based on charges which
had been filed with the EEOC between seven and nine years prior to the
institution of the suit.' The court held that absent justification by the
Commission a delay of such duration was unreasonable.'67 The court also
found that Bell had been prejudiced because it could be expected that after
such a lapse of time witnesses would have become unavailable and those
witnesses who were available would have only vague memories of the
events on which the charges were based.' The court accordingly barred
the EEOC's suit on the basis of the Administrative Procedure Act.'6'
Despite judicial willingness to apply the Administrative Procedure Act
to bar EEOC actions, there are problems inherent in such an application.
First, the Act applies to judicial review of actions of administrative agen-
cies. 7' The court in which the EEOC brings a Title VII action does not act
as a reviewing court, but rather as a court presiding over a trail de novo. 7'
once it had determined that Georgia Power and Griffin Wheel did not mandate a holding that
such a defense was available in EEOC suits. 416 F. Supp. at 1004.
16 426 F. Supp. 785 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
" Id. at 788.
166 Id. at 792. The Commission also alleged that Bell was guilty of sex discrimination in
the administration of maternity benefits. Id. However, the charge upon which the sex discrim-
ination allegation was based had been filed with the Commission less than a year prior to
the institution of the suit, and Bell did not claim that an action based on the sex discrimina-
tion charge should be barred. Id.
"I Id. at 792-93. The court apparently based its decision that the delay was unreasonable
solely on the passage of time. Id. The Bell Helicopter court did not attempt to discern whether
the delay resulted from the EEOC's backlog alone or from a dilatory attitude on the part of
the Commission. The lack of investigation of the cause of the delay indicates a sharp depar-
ture from the approach taken by the court in Chromcraft. See Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC,
465 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1972). The Chromcraft court determined that the delay did not result
from a "dilatory attitude" on the part of the Commission. Id. at 748. See text accompanying
notes 149-50 supra. The Bell Helicopter court simply stated that the delay was too long to be
excusable absent some justification other than the extent of the EEOC's backlog. 426 F.
Supp. at 793.
lu Id. The court did not find that witnesses were in fact unavailable or unable to recall
the events. It said that such results were "to be expected" after the passage of 7 to 9 years.
Id.
" Id. at 791. The court also addressed the issue of availability of a defense of laches in
EEOC suits. The court examined the Georgia Power and Griffin Wheel decisions and deter-
mined that the issue of availability of a defense of laches to EEOC suits had not been before
the courts. Id. at 789-90. Therefore, the statements in Georgia Power and Griffin Wheel were
dictum and did not provide authority for holding that such a defense was available. Id. at
790. Since the Bell Helicopter court found that the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 706 (1976), provided an alternative basis for deciding the case before it, the court did not
analyze the laches issue any further. 426 F. Supp. at 790.
110 Chapter 7 of Title 5, of which 5 U.S.C. § 706 is a part, is entitled "Judicial Review."
5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1976).
"I A trial de novo is "a new trial or retrial in an appellate court in which the whole case
is gone into as if no trial whatever had been had in the court below." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
1677 (Revised 4th ed., 1968).
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Since application of the Administrative Procedure Act is limited to review-
ing courts, the Act should not apply to a trial court in an EEOC action.'72
Second, the Act only authorizes courts to compel agency action unrea-
sonably delayed. 17 3 Courts must bar, not compel agency actions if the Act
is used as a basis for a defense to an EEOC action. The common meaning
of the statutory language must be strained to support a construction of the
Act that would license the courts to bar Commission actions. Such a con-
struction would grant broad discretionary powers to the courts, yet the
language of the Act indicates Congressional effort to limit the scope of the
courts' review.' The statutory language indicates that Congress intended
to constrain the courts by imposing narrowly defined affirmative duties
upon them rather than granting broad discretionary powers.," The Act
lists specific judicial obligations and functions that courts are required to
perform.'76 The language of the statute does not support an argument for
the existence of a defense founded in the Administrative Procedure Act.'77
The problems inherent in applying the Administrative Procedure Act 76
as a defense to EEOC suits, however, apparently have been outweighed by
judicial concern for the defendant-employer who has been prejudiced by
Commission delays. In Occidental Life Insurance Co.,' the Supreme
Court recognized the need to consider the plight of defendant-employers
in order to reach a just result.80 Defenses based on the doctrine of laches
and the Administrative Procedure Act permit consideration of the inequi-
ties facing the defendant-employer without undue frustration of the na-
tional policy against discrimination in employment.
The Supreme Court's holding in Occidental, "I that state statutes of
limitations do not apply to EEOC actions, stemmed from a concern that
meritorious claims would be barred if the Commission were forced to con-
form to rigid time limits and that enforcement of Title VII would be frus-
trated solely because of administrative delay.' 2 The elements necessary for
7I See EEOC v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 13 FAiR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. 792, 793 (E.D. Va. 1976)
(Administrative Procedure Act not applicable to trials de novo). But see EEOC v. Bell
Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 791-92 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (Act reflects general policy applica-
ble to trial court despite express limitations to courts of review).
'7 See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1) (1976) at note 142 supra.
'' Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 465 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir. 1972).
'7 Id.
'' See text of Act at note 142 supra. Courts are only authorized to exercise the powers
granted by the Act when "necessary to decision." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
Rather than granting discretion, the Act provides that the courts "shall compel agency action
... unreasonably delayed." 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
,' See EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 791-92 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (language
of Act alone does not support holding that Act can serve as basis for defense; however, judicial
authority sufficiently supports such holding).
178 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976). See text accompanying notes 170-77 supra.
'7' 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977).
"I Id. at 2458; see note 140 supra.
" 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977).
" Id. at 2456.
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a defense based on the doctrine of laches or the Administrative Procedure
Act safeguard against such a frustration of national policy. Not only must
there be delay, but the delay must be unreasonable.8 3 Furthermore, the
delay must cause prejudice to the defendant-employer.' 4 The necessity for
determining whether unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice are pres-
ent compels a case by case analysis and mitigates against overly broad
application of laches or the Administrative Procedure Act.' 5
Of the two alternatives, the doctrine of laches presents the employer
with a more desirable defense. When applying a defense of laches, courts
are free from the limiting strictures imposed by the Act.'5 ' Given a showing
of unreasonable delay and prejudice in a given case, there need only be
proof that the EEOC is acting to enforce a private right to bring a defense
of laches into play. The courts have required a minimal showing of unrea-
sonable delay and resulting prejudice before applying a defense of laches.'87
Because defenses based on laches and the Act have been characterized as
indistinguishable, "s the inference that unreasonable delay and resulting
prejudice to the defendant arise from the passage of time alone under the
Administrative Procedure Act'8 might be drawn by courts applying a de-
fense of laches. Furthermore, the apparent abrogation of the public-private
right distinction in recent court decisions'0 removes any analytical barrier
to applying a defense of laches to all EEOC suits regardless of the type of
relief sought.
The tendency of courts to overlook the problems of applying the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act"' and the demise of the importance of the
public-private right distinction in applying a defense of laches indicates
judicial willingness to protect employers from the harsh effects of EEOC
delays. In Occidental Life Insurance Co.,"' the Supreme Court, while hold-
10 See text accompanying notes 89-138 and 142-69 supra.
Zu Id.
"' See text accompanying notes 144-69 supra. Since the defendant must show prejudice,
the danger of intentional delay by a defendant to prevent a finding of reasonable cause or
successful conciliation is obviated. A defendant may not claim prejudice due to delays he
himself has caused. EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 186 (E.D. Va. 1976).
'" See text accompanying notes 170-77 supra.
" See, e.g., EEOC v. J.C. Penney Co., 12 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. CAs. 640, 642 (N.D. Ala.
1975) (processing of complaints out of order received sufficient to show unreasonable delay
on part of Commission); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 302 (M.D. Ga.
1975) (prejudice found when witnesses, although physically available, had vague memories
of facts serving as basis for suit). Defendants may also be prejudiced by their own destruction
of pertinent records. Id. at 302-03.
.I EEOC v. Exchange Security Bank, 529 F.2d 1214, 1216-17 (5th Cir. 1976); EEOC v.
American Nat'l Bank, 420 F. Supp. 181, 186 (E.D. Va. 1976).
"I See EEOC v. Bell Helicopter Co., 426 F. Supp. 785, 793 (N.D. Tex. 1976) and text
accompanying notes 167-68 supra.
" See, e.g., Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977); EEOC v. J.C.
Penney Co., 12 FAIR EMPL. PRAc. CAs. 640 (N.D. Ala. 1976); EEOC v. C & D Sportswear
Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
"' 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
" 97 S. Ct. 2447 (1977).
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ing that defendants cannot invoke state statutes of limitations as a de-
fense, acknowledged that the federal courts have discretionary power to
"locate a just result" in EEOC suits.'93 The equitable doctrine of laches
and the Administrative Procedure Act, as the Act has been applied by the
courts, 94 provide ideal vehicles for balancing the important national policy
embodied by Title VII against notions of fundamental fairness for the
employer.
WnLLAM L. HALLAM
' Id. at 2458.
,' See text accompanying notes 144-69 supra.
